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In my article ‘The impossibility of finitism: from SSK to ESK?’ (Tyfield 
2008), I argued that the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is an 
important, indeed necessary, precursor of an economics of scientific 
knowledge (ESK), opening the way for the empirical exploration of the 
impact of economic factors on the production of scientific knowledge. 
Without SSK’s arguments for the irreducible social-situatedness of 
science, such an ESK would be precluded, as explaining the development 
of scientific knowledge would be the preserve of an ‘internalist’ 
philosophy of science. SSK is thus an invaluable and indispensable 
contribution to our understanding of the actual scientific process. 
I also argued, however, that SSK has some very serious philosophical 
problems. Most of the literature focuses on the problem of reflexivity. I 
focused, though, on a problem that I argued is more profound but that 
has received much less attention, namely ‘meaning finitism’. This 
philosophical position has been increasingly emphasized by SSK, 
particularly of the Edinburgh School, as its primary philosophical basis. 
I argued that meaning finitism completely undermines the project of 
SSK because its explicit pronouncements contradict its necessary 
conditions of intelligibility, so that it is intelligible only if it is false. 
Finally, having repudiated both the anti-SSK ‘rationalist’ philosophy 
of science and the anti-philosophical meaning finitism of SSK, I argued 
that a transcendental analysis of the necessary conditions of 
intelligibility of meaning-making (including in the scientific process) 
offers a way out of this problem. Were SSK (and ESK) to embrace this 
transcendental philosophical analysis, however, it would be recast as an 
(immanently) critical endeavour, capable of the empirical examination of 
science (at which it is good) without constantly having to fight rearguard 
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philosophical actions to preserve its own capacity for reasoned 
judgement (at which it is not good). 
I have opened this rejoinder to Giraud and Weintraub’s (2009) 
response to my paper by restating my argument briefly because I hope 
this shows how far their characterization of my paper is from what it 
does in fact argue. Giraud and Weintraub’s response makes absolutely 
no mention of the transcendental analysis at the heart of my argument. 
Nor does it discuss the critique of meaning finitism at any length. 
Discussion of the two central issues to my paper is thus simply absent. 
Instead, they caricature my position (Giraud and Weintraub 2009, 53) as 
simply an all-too-familiar anti-SSK tirade of a recidivist philosophy of 
science; indeed one with a lineage from time immemorial (pp. 57-58). 
The hugely positive assessment of SSK and the repudiation of such 
‘internalist’ philosophy of science in my paper are also thereby simply 
disregarded. 
Nevertheless, I am grateful to Giraud and Weintraub for giving me 
this opportunity to clarify my position. I expect what follows is also 
unlikely to convince them, but it will at least serve to repudiate some 
important misreadings of my argument. In only a brief article such as 
this there is insufficient space to deal exhaustively with all the points 
raised by their reply. I will therefore proceed directly to the substantive 
issues their reply raises. I must first, however, briefly rebut a number of 
the more shrill of their accusations, though others will have to go 
unanswered. 
A major plank of their argument is that I either misquote or do not 
reference at all central claims of my characterization of SSK. The 
implication is that the SSK criticized is a straw man, indeed “simply 
strange” or “absurd” (Giraud and Weintraub 2009, 55-56)—despite my 
explicit care to appraise SSK on its own terms (Tyfield 2008, 71-72). 
There are several issues here. First, I must reply regarding the specific 
allegation of ‘sententious’ misquotation regarding the ‘baby throwing 
itself out with its own bathwater’ analogy (Giraud and Weintraub 2009, 
57; referring to Tyfield 2008, 73). As my use of this phrase makes 
perfectly clear, I am not quoting Hands directly (the phrase is not in 
quotation marks) but I reference him since the phrase per se is his not 
mine, albeit in a different context. Lest there be any doubt, here again is 
what I say: “Hands (1994, 95) uses the phrase, but I note that he is not 
referring directly to SSK when he does so” (Tyfield 2008, 73, footnote 
16). Furthermore, the footnote continues with references to others who 
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have used similar phraseology about SSK itself, so that my use of it is 
indeed familiar and defensible. 
Secondly, that I do not offer references in some sentences regarding 
characterizations or criticisms of SSK is simply beside the point. On the 
one hand, my characterization is heavily referenced, so there is plenty of 
evidence presented for the views attributed to SSK (see inter alia Barnes 
and Bloor 1982; Barnes, et al. 1996; Bloor 1981, 1991, 1997, 1998, 2004), 
including specific examples of directly contradictory pronouncements 
from leading SSK proponents (e.g., Tyfield 2008, 76, footnote 19). 
Arguing that they are absent in some specific sentences is simply to 
make selective use of the whole paper. On the other, their demand 
seems to rule out any paraphrasing for the sake of subsequent 
philosophical appraisal. Yet it is SSK’s argument that I am assessing and 
I see no reason why I should be limited to use its own words to do so. 
Ironically, much of Giraud and Weintraub’s comments are 
themselves based on misreadings and non-sequiturs, which seem to 
evidence a determination to find fault rather than a will to engage. 
Amongst the most striking examples is the claim that “Tyfield is aware 
of his illegitimate move” (Giraud and Weintraub 2009, 55) regarding a 
shift from the ‘pragmatist’ theory of truth supposedly employed by SSK 
to the ‘anti-pragmatist’ one allegedly employed in my argument. In fact, 
I do not accept this move is illegitimate, as I discuss below. But the 
evidence adduced for this alleged mea culpa is a footnote clarifying the 
different, and potentially confusing, use of the term ‘extension’ by 
philosophers and sociologists, respectively as the set of things covered 
by a class-term and the act of developing or extending that set. It is hard 
to see the connection here with the point Giraud and Weintraub are 
making. 
Similarly, dismissing my characterization of SSK as simply absurd 
also depends upon misquotation and wilful refusal to understand what 
is being said. For instance, following the quotation of a paragraph 
regarding the factors involved in the development of science, they 
suggest that the quotation attributes to SSK some outlandish views 
about epistemological issues regarding the interaction of evidence and 
theory (Giraud and Weintraub 2009, 55). Yet the paragraph clearly refers 
to SSK’s (legitimate) repudiation of the belief of ‘philosophers of science’ 
that the development of science can be fully explained by an internalist 
account, i.e., an entirely orthogonal issue, as the sentence immediately 
following (which they choose not to quote) makes clear: “SSK’s solution 
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is that social interests are the relevant determining factor and thus 
social science can explain the development of science more generally 
(Barnes 1982, 35; Barnes, et al. 1996, 29)” (Tyfield 2008, 67). 
Let us turn now to the substantive points in their reply, of which 
three are particularly important. These are: (1) that my argument is 
based primarily on the impatience of a “philosopher of science” (Giraud 
and Weintraub 2009, 58) with SSK; (2) that this is illegitimate as SSK 
must be appraised according to its own pragmatist criteria, and thus not 
doing so presents a straw man that merely finds in SSK faults of its own 
making; and (3) that the argument as a whole evidences a familiar lack 
of engagement with SSK’s sociological work, rather than philosophical 
argument, as can be seen in my demand for the illegitimate importation 
of an evaluative or normative dimension to its descriptive, empirical 
programme. I will deal with each of these in turn. 
First, let me restate that I think SSK, in both its philosophical 
pronouncements and sociological work, offers exceptionally important 
and cogent insights into understanding of the development of scientific 
knowledge. For instance, I whole-heartedly endorse the argument that 
explaining why scientific controversies pass cannot be conducted on the 
presumption that the ‘true’ position prevailed, but depends 
(overwhelmingly, perhaps) on the entirely contingent consonance of 
particular positions and social context and the sheer fading into 
obscurity of those who oppose the emergent dominant paradigm and 
their findings (e.g., Barnes, et al. 1996, 35). I also gladly concede to 
Giraud and Weintraub that scientific knowledge is accepted by 
particular scientists on the basis of pragmatic, socio-historically situated 
judgement and so must be empirically studied as such. 
Nevertheless, from within SSK thus, I remain critical of it on two 
counts. First, its philosophical reflections undermine its important 
sociological programme and, moreover, do so needlessly. Giraud and 
Weintraub seem to claim that one must be implacably opposed to SSK to 
see this as the case. Yet this is manifestly contradicted by the heated 
debate within SSK regarding self-refutation and the implications of it 
(e.g., Pickering 1992). Their insinuation that to be critical of SSK is to be 
anti-SSK ex ante is thus totally bogus. Secondly, I argue that rectifying 
SSK’s needless and needlessly distracting philosophical aporia also 
thereby alters the sociological project slightly, by admitting the 
normative dimension, always already there, of its subject matter. 
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These two criticisms, in fact, map almost directly onto Giraud and 
Weintraub’s second and third substantive criticisms, namely the 
illegitimacy of appraising SSK with non-pragmatist criteria (to use their 
terminology), and the illegitimacy of demanding a critical edge to SSK 
respectively. In turning to these issues, though, I will focus specifically 
on the issue of meaning finitism, not pragmatism as Giraud and 
Weintraub do, for three reasons: first, my original paper focuses on the 
former not the latter as the central philosophical position of SSK, pace 
Giraud and Weintraub’s suggestion to the contrary (2009, 52-53) that it 
is my argument that finitism is central to SSK, rather than SSK’s own 
claim that it is so;1 secondly, shifting to the latter would thus demand a 
fuller treatment than can be provided in the limited space of a reply; 
and finally, I would argue in any case that the issues raised by Giraud 
and Weintraub are subsidiary problems to that of meaning finitism and 
so can be dealt with substantially the same form of reasoning. 
Taking each issue in turn, I readily concede that SSK (or indeed any 
position) cannot be legitimately appraised except from within, i.e., by 
way of immanent critique. Otherwise analysis does indeed lead to the 
problems Giraud and Weintraub indicate regarding straw man fallacies 
and finding problems that are the result of the evaluating framework 
itself, not the position being appraised. However, this does not mean 
that SSK can only be philosophically assessed using pragmatist criteria, 
for immanent critique also includes comparison of what a position 
states and what it necessarily presupposes. This is precisely the nature 
of my argument regarding SSK’s problems with meaning finitism; i.e., it 
involves the assessment of meaning finitism not according to some ex 
ante, externally imposed criteria, as Giraud and Weintraub argue, but 
using concepts that it itself necessarily uses as a condition of its 
intelligibility. 
This form of argument, examining necessary conditions of 
intelligibility, however, leads to a two-stage critique. The first stage 
highlights the contradiction between explicit pronouncements and 
implicit presuppositions, leading to the conclusion that the former must 
be false. In the case of meaning finitism, as I show in my paper, this 
leads to the conclusion that this position is intelligible only if it is false 
because it presupposes intensional, and not merely extensional, 
meaning—meaning that, both, enables and constrains its future use—
while explicitly denying such. But insofar as the latter (e.g., 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Barnes, et al. 1996; Bloor 1998; Bloor 2004. 
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intensionality) is derived by transcendental argument, starting from the 
pragmatic, socio-historically situated premises demanded of a 
legitimately non-foundationalist SSK, then SSK no longer needs to 
choose between the false dilemma of a non-foundationalist 
extensionalism (use determines meaning) and an ex ante intensionalism 
(meaning determines use). Rather the open-ended non-logically-
determined and eminently socio-pragmatic matter of extensionality of 
meaning is seen to be a mutual condition of intelligibility of 
intensionality. And intensionality is understood here as the possibility 
of a proposition or term to have a determinate meaning in a given socio-
historical context and not a fixed, complete and perfect essence. 
The conclusion of my argument is thus that the concepts repudiated 
by SSK (in this case intensionality) are both fundamentally ungrounded, 
as SSK correctly argues, and necessary or inescapable, as it consistently 
denies, hence its intractable philosophical problems. SSK often comes 
tantalizingly close to this conclusion itself, only to refute it at the last 
minute. For instance, Barnes, Bloor, and Henry (1996, 85) state that 
“there would appear to be no escaping a realist orientation to the world 
we live in and the ubiquitous conventions of the realist mode of 
speech”. This is incredibly close to my argument, but this conclusion is 
cast in terms of a particularly intractable and lamentable social 
‘convention’, and one SSK should be on its guard to repudiate. Yet the 
fact that such ‘realist’ talk cannot be avoided is because it is a necessary 
condition of intelligibility of discourse itself, not because of social 
convention identifiable a posteriori. In short, SSK need only admit this 
problem to be an inescapable philosophical one, and it could preserve 
its non-foundationalism or pragmatism while forsaking its forlorn 
attempt to do without that on which it necessarily depends. 
This takes us to the final point, namely the suggestion that my paper 
overlooks empirical work in SSK and is thus harmfully incomplete in its 
conclusions regarding what can and cannot be done by ESK and SSK. In 
particular, it is argued that I would aim to have a SSK/ESK that can 
uncover the deleterious effects of commerce on a pristine “virginal” 
science (Giraud and Weintraub 2009, 58), while actual SSK work, such as 
Shapin’s (2008), does engage with these issues but yields completely 
different insights. 
Certainly, there is little discussion in my paper of the details of this 
literature, if only due to constraints of space and the paper’s primary 
focus on a philosophical argument. It is also the case that I would like 
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an ESK that can explore the impact of economic social factors on the 
production of scientific knowledge, and in ways that go beyond the 
insights yielded by existing SSK. This is not, however, premised upon an 
ex ante presumption (borne of a ‘rationalist’ philosophy of science) that 
‘money’ is ‘bad’ for science—what Mirowski and Van Horn (2005) have 
called ‘Mertonian Toryism’—but the acknowledgement that the goals of 
commerce and of science, manifest in all their complexity in concrete 
situations, may often be in conflict; which is hardly controversial. Hence, 
as I put it in my article, an ESK “should be able to offer a critique of how 
and where the imposition of economic imperatives on scientific research 
has a detrimental effect on the ‘scientific knowledge’ thereby produced” 
(Tyfield 2008, 82, emphasis added). And, perhaps I should add as its 
flipside: how and where it has no such detrimental effect. 
On this conception, however, Giraud and Weintraub’s citation of 
Shapin’s (2008) new book as the kind of work that shows what SSK can 
do and its incompatibility with the programme I am proposing—to my 
supposed “annoyance” (Giraud and Weintraub 2009, 58)—can be seen to 
be quite wrong, for in many respects this is exactly what Shapin’s book 
does. Indeed, Giraud and Weintraub may be pleased (or perhaps 
disappointed) to know that I read this book (as other work in the field) 
with great interest. I thoroughly endorse Shapin’s statement that “later 
modern entrepreneurial science is sometimes celebrated and sometimes 
condemned. […] But […] rarely is it described in much detail” (Shapin 
2008, 229, original emphasis) and that this forms a good basis for a 
programme of social scientific work. Similarly, I fully accept Shapin’s 
insistence upon the need to explore the ongoing shift in boundaries 
between commerce and science in detail, as a social phenomenon that is 
not fully amenable to “unitary, simple or tidy” linear accounts (Shapin 
2008, 13)—from mythical pasts to idealized present—and that such 
research should be based upon the presumption that “it is better to see 
the relationship between virtue and the pursuit of knowledge [as one 
that] has been reconfigured than to assume it has been dispensed with” 
(Shapin 2008, 17). 
However, I do not accept Shapin’s explicit protestations (Shapin 
2008, 18, 313)—even while I accept them to be perfectly genuine—that 
his work is thus purely descriptive and without any normative 
conclusions. Certainly, normative commitments cannot legitimately 
structure the empirical work ex ante, but supposedly neutral description 
of that which is always already value-laden is impossible and will in 
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general serve merely to naturalize the status quo. The only way to avoid 
this, and thus to keep open the relevant normative questions, is to 
engage with them explicitly. In this respect, Shapin’s investigation can 
be seen to be radically incomplete. He asks effectively: is individual 
scientific virtue equally prevalent in both academic and industrial 
settings? Yet the more important question, and the one that keeps open 
the associated normative issues, is: how has commercializing science 
changed the science done and which or whose interests does this 
privilege? Shapin’s question describes the problem, while the latter 
situates it, and both are necessary. 
Against Giraud and Weintraub’s (2009, 57) suggestion that my 
position is one of a stout defender of the moral purity of science against 
the relativist barbarians, the transformed and critical SSK I am 
proposing explores science as a highly contested, social and value-laden 
process—both after and before its current commercialization. In this 
context, though, SSK has the role of identifying the social forces 
impacting on the production of science and holding these up for open, 
participatory debate. 
Furthermore, this is not to deny that the complexity of the empirical 
reality renders such normative judgement difficult. But it does not make 
it impossible, unless one is tacitly assuming that normative judgement 
must itself always be sweeping and monochrome, rather than detailed 
and nuanced. Indeed, the conclusion of such investigation is both a 
wholesome disillusionment with grand black-and-white normative 
judgements, as per reasonable pragmatist scepticism, and detailed 
understanding of the complex interweaving of potentially contradictory 
normative trends and effects based on acknowledgement of the 
inescapability of normative judgement on social phenomena, for all its 
difficulty. It is the latter that SSK’s descriptivist posture systematically 
occludes. 
To be sure, this is a more politically engaged form of SSK, but I am 
by no means alone in arguing for this from within science and 
technology studies (STS) more broadly, where there are increasing calls 
for STS to engage with political issues, including evaluation of the 
effects of commercialisation of science on the ‘knowledge’ produced 
(e.g., a forthcoming special edition of Social Studies of Science). 
Furthermore, with both grand normative conclusions and denial of 
normative responsibility ruled out, the conclusion of such enquiry is not 
crude political slogans but the deepening of the embodied capacity for 
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normative judgement, i.e., a form of ‘moral/political education’ with 
potentially significant social repercussions. 
In short, in our mutual affirmation of Hess’s comment that the 
“dismissive caricatures and distortions of a huge volume of theory and 
research” (Hess 1997, 1; as quoted on Giraud and Weintraub 2009, 57) is 
potentially even more troubling than some of SSK’s more relativist 
excesses, Giraud and Weintraub’s and my position are much closer than 
they evidently care to admit. Nevertheless, their dismissive refusal to 
engage with the latter, and arguments about it, does little to further the 
debate. Indeed, such hostile repudiation of even SSK-sympathetic 
criticism can only deepen the philosophical problems that beset SSK by 
encouraging the continued refusal even to admit their existence. It is 
also effectively to block any possibility of moving beyond the sterile and 
heated debate about the problem of reflexivity, to which Giraud and 
Weintraub seem committed to drag us back. Conversely, I would argue 
that the transcendental analysis and critical project I have proposed 
could lead beyond the long-standing ‘dialogue of the deaf’ between SSK 
and philosophy of science to their mutual improvement and benefit. 
Readers will decide for themselves which path seems more attractive. 
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